A new mission in Afghanistan

It is time for a significant and sustained reduction of American combat forces in Afghanistan; time to shift our strategy from one of counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism and to focus our engagement on those who present a real and continuing threat to our national security.

The events of 9-11 clearly justified our intervention in Afghanistan to defeat al Qaida and bring Bin Laden to justice. Our original goals have been largely met. According to the Director of the CIA, fewer than 100 members of Al Qaida remain in Afghanistan. Bin Laden is dead. We have drained the swamp and our task now is not nation-building in Afghanistan, but ensuring that the swamp does not fill again. We can accomplish that mission with a fraction of the current force. We can send tens of thousands of troops home to their families and to a grateful nation.

In finding Bin laden and bringing him to justice, we have struck a serious blow to  Al Qaida’s leadership that has allowed us to reevaluate the wisdom of pursuing a broad and open-ended strategy, where the mounting costs are far too high – in lives lost, blood spilled, traumatic injury to our brave men and women in uniform, and in real dollars spent. Nearly 1,500 brave men and women have lost their lives in Afghanistan, nearly 12,000 have been wounded in action. The price tag, at a time when we are scrutinizing every dollar in Washington and making cuts to critical domestic programs, is a staggering $10 billion a month. 

Non-military contributions to Afghan reconstruction and development from 2002 to 2010 have reached $19 billion and despite the costs, many of these projects are at risk of falling into disrepair because of inadequate planning to pay for ongoing, long-term operations and maintenance. This is not how we should be spending taxpayer dollars.

Not only are the costs in lives and treasure far too high, but there is a growing consensus that - absent a very long and sustained commitment involving many troops on the ground - we cannot win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people – or even of Afghan President Karzai, who has repeatedly berated the U.S. effort and most recently stated that U.S. and NATO forces risk becoming an occupying force that would have to be ousted from the country. 

We have to ask - even if we were willing to make the enormous economic commitment required to build a democracy - what is the likelihood of our success?

The Afghan government is corrupt, our working relationship with President Karzai is crumbling and our focus on building security forces is challenged because its membership largely excludes Pashtuns in the south, the base of Taliban. I’m not certain that there is an amount of money or a plan that can overcome such odds.

At this point, I do not see a clear path to a reasonable and sustainable victory. We need a tailored counter-terrorism strategy to protect our narrow national security interests and that will meet our fiduciary responsibilities. The time has come to allow Afghans to draw on the 290,000 men who have selflessly committed to securing their country’s future and to allow them the opportunity to defend their nation and their people. 

We can and should serve as a guide to the Afghan government and to provide necessary, achievable and sustainable assistance to bolster their efforts, but ultimately, it is up to the Afghan government and people to rebuild their nation. The notion that we will win in Afghanistan if we deploy enough forces and spend enough money falls under the category of conventional-Washington-wisdom that says more is better. 

In my view, better is better. If we better focus our mission on the real threats with specialized troops who are better trained to locate and destroy terrorist hideouts, we will have a sustainable, winnable, counter-terrorism mission that protects our national security, meets our fiduciary responsibilities, and serves the interests of our military men and women and their families who have sacrificed so much on behalf of a grateful nation.