Syria's unfolding tragedy and its impending spillover

As yet another diplomatic deadline passes with no compliance, Syria’s unfolding tragedy accelerates into a vicious downward cycle. Even a nominal cease-fire will only provide a temporary respite to fighting. Since the uprising’s start in March 2011, the Assad regime and opposition forces are further apart than ever. The conflict’s intensification is likely to shift to a bloodier phase, from relatively low intensity civil war to protracted conflict.

In retrospect, the crisis reached its point of no return some time ago. The narrow window of opportunity required a negotiated settlement from the very beginning. With more than 9,000 dead, too much blood has been shed. Arguably, the conflict is irreversible.

The standard pattern of buying diplomatic time to employ armed force to weaken opponents continues. Ultimately, the regime will acquiesce to negotiations solely requiring rhetorical concessions designed to placate international opinion and provide a face saving outlet for opponents. In exchange, Assad will accept nothing less than full compliance with his demands.

Although seriously threatened, the regime is far from collapse. It still dominates the conflict’s pace. Opposition forces still lack effective organization and weaponry to turn the tide. However, they are supported by popular determination and resilience. Inflicting massacres and harsh collective punishments have not served as deterrents. If anything, opposition ranks swell with new recruits. If properly armed, they may wage a formidable insurgency, both urban and rural, through coordinated attacks and disrupt the supply lines of over extended regime forces. Increasing numbers of battle hardened regional volunteers, particularly from Libya, and accompanying weaponry can also alter the momentum. Should any of Libya’s missing MANPADS (shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles) make their way to the Syrian battlefield, a drastically game changing dimension can materialize.

Either by force, or at the negotiating table, the regime is determined to downgrade the opposition to the fullest possible extent. At best, to decimate it completely. In the least, to contain it effectively.  Despite any lack of progress, diplomacy must continue.  For any potential punitive measures, or sanctions, to have international credibility it must be unequivocally clear that Assad’s intransigence exhausted the process and no other options remain.  As developments shift in this direction, China still sits on the fence until necessity requires a firm decision. Russia is desperately trying to strike a diplomatic balance and avoid isolation within the international community. Despite strong ties to the Assad regime, it must begin thinking beyond this framework in order to preserve whatever remains of its vastly diminished credibility in the region and elsewhere.

Fatalities on Syria’s border with Turkey and Lebanon provide fresh reminders of the long feared potential for the conflict’s spillover. The Turkish Prime Minister’s standing for confrontation at home is being challenged at his frontiers. Despite Mr. Erdogan’s strong anti-Assad rhetoric, caution dominates his actions. The Syrian crisis has exposed his diplomatic limitations.  After years of cultivating a regional image as friend to all, time has arrived to take sides. This risks not only involvement in a broader regional conflict but threatens to spark simmering and neglected divisions at home.

With fragile Lebanon constantly teetering on the brink, the burden of responsibility on its political leaders to restrain sectarian tensions is greater than any time since the end of its own civil war in 1990. The precursor to the current Arab awakening was Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution of 2005, arguably the first real display of people power in contemporary Arab history. Although it led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops, the revolution reached paralysis as Lebanon’s politicians reverted to their traditional divisions. Now they face stark choices. One is to allow external forces to destabilize Lebanon again. The alternative is reversing the historical pattern by astutely using the current Syrian crisis as an opportunity to promote greater national consensus and statehood. It may not revive the spirit of the Cedar Revolution, but can certainly avoid becoming an extension of Syria’s civil war and repeating its own 15 year conflagration.  

Vicenzino provides geopolitical risk analysis and regular commentary on leading global media outlets. He is director of the Global Strategy Project.

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