Iranian-American Détente

A date finally has been set for a new round of talks between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany (P-5+1) – April 13th. This is good news, but it begs the broader question of how to resolve Iran’s conflict-prone relationships with the rest of the world.  There is an eerie similarity between the Islamic Republic’s now 33-year conflict with the US and its allies and the 45-year long US-Soviet Cold War. Eerily similar, but different in one major respect. Throughout the Cold War, the US and the USSR maintained a rich menu of negotiations, exchanges, and agreements. With rare exceptions, representatives of the US and Iran don’t even speak to one another – even when they’re in the same room. Current US policy makers would be well advised to learn the lesson of victory in the Cold War. Be tough when necessary, but conflicts only end through negotiations.
 
In the early years of the Cold War, the ideological struggle between the US and the Soviet Union was expressed by military confrontations in Europe and mutual threats of nuclear annihilation. As the years passed, the conflict evolved into back alley confrontations between covert operatives, economic sanctions, and wars by proxy armies. Yet, the two superpowers always maintained diplomatic relations and a broad and deep dialogue, including at the highest levels of government. As early as 1956, General Nathan Twining led a delegation of Air Force officials to Moscow, beginning a rich variety of military exchanges that flourished in later years and put a human face on the “enemy.”

 Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers established the “Hot-line,” permitting the two heads-of-state to speak to one another without intermediaries. Protocols also were worked out to avoid inadvertent military clashes, culminating in the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement. Sports, scientific, and cultural exchanges allowed the two societies to gain some insight into each other. A wide range of official negotiations covered topics as diverse as weapons of mass destruction, European security, economic issues, and human rights. The 1975 Helsinki Accords were particularly important for opening up Soviet society, enabling Russian elites to understand the better life that could be possible if the Cold War ended. 
 
The US-Iran conflict has followed a different path. When a popular revolution overthrew the Shah in 1979, it became clear immediately that the United States and the Islamic Republic had strikingly different visions of the Middle East. In the early years, this conflict was accentuated by the US’s tacit alignment with Saddam Hussein’s long war against Iran and by Iranian support for Hezbollah and other terrorist groups that kidnapped and killed Americans in Lebanon. As the years passed, the US-Iran “Cold War” has played out much as its predecessor did, featuring harsh threats, covert operations, economic sanctions, wars by proxies, and even direct, if limited, military clashes.
 

But the US-Iran struggle has lacked the conversations, exchanges, communications channels, and negotiations that accompanied the real Cold War. Diplomatic relations between Washington and Tehran were cut off in 1979 and official negotiations have taken place since then only through intermediaries, or for short periods in multinational forums. Official exchanges are even restricted by legislation! When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen suggested in 2011 the negotiation of a communications channel and protocol to avoid inadvertent naval conflict in the Persian Gulf, he was roundly condemned in the Congress.
 
Currently, the US is greatly concerned about the ultimate goals of Iran’s nuclear program, which Tehran claims is intended for peaceful purposes, but the degree of American angst is amplified by the fundamentally distrustful relationship between the two states, and the lack of information about each other. There is no doubt that the nuclear issue should remain the priority for US policy toward Iran, but it is long past due that the US consider a broader strategy of engagement.
 
The US and Iran have fundamental differences about the Middle East; yet they also have some common concerns, not least of which is avoiding a war that neither wants. Not only should the US seek to ensure the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program through negotiations in the upcoming P-5+1 forum, but it should also aim to resolve issues in which we may share common interests, such as maritime security, the drug trade, avoiding chaos in Iraq, and the future of Afghanistan, bilaterally. A policy is needed that seeks, over time, to protect American interests in the Middle East, yet recognizes that Iran, too, has legitimate concerns and that it is in both sides’ interest to coexist peacefully. Civilian exchanges, military-military contacts, direct communications channels, and diplomatic interactions are all part such a strategy. Obviously, the fundamental political issues between the US and Iran will not be resolved soon, but such an effort could eventually provide major payoffs for both nations.  

Blechman is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington-D.C.-based non-profit, non-partisan institution devoted to enhancing international peace and security. He and Moore are the authors of a new report released March 15, “Iran in Perspective: Holding Iran to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.”

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