For context, the Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that international trade with all countries benefits the U.S. economy by more than $1 trillion a year. The Korea FTA alone is estimated to generate more than $10 billion in gains for the U.S. economy. Many of those trade gains would not have been possible without the political consensus made possible in no small part by TAA. The $1 billion TAA budget is a tiny investment in addressing the needs of displaced workers that will continue to yield outsized returns.
Viewed another way, if the United States cannot afford to invest in helping those harmed by trade, how can it afford to forego the $7.3 billion in lost tariff revenue that CBO estimates will result from the U.S.-Korea FTA over the next decade?
Finally, many contend that linking TAA to the U.S.-Korea FTA is a "gross breach" of the fast track rules under which the Congress considers trade agreements. In fact, under fast track the president is specifically empowered to include other provisions in FTA implementing legislation that are "necessary and appropriate" and this power has been used numerous times in the past. For example, sweeping customs modernization legislation was included in previous FTA implementing legislation and approved by Congress under fast track rules. Specifically relevant to this debate, TAA reforms were included in the 1993 fast track legislation that implemented the NAFTA.
Given all the fuss over linking TAA to the U.S.-Korea FTA, it is notable that no one seems to have noticed that both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee approved linking renewal of two large trade preference programs for developing countries -- the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) -- to the implementation of legislation for the U.S.-Colombia FTA. This oversight by critics is especially odd since the amount of foregone tariff revenues due to those renewals -- about $600 million per year -- approaches cost of TAA. Furthermore, GSP -- though meritorious in its own right -- has nothing to do with the U.S.-Colombia FTA, since Colombia will no longer be eligible for the preferences. By contrast, reauthorizing and reforming TAA is directly "necessary and appropriate" since implementing new FTAs without a program in place to deal with those Americans that may lose their jobs from trade would be simply irresponsible.
Congress and the administration are right to press forward immediately on approving the FTAs with Korea, Panama, and Colombia. But at the same time it is entirely "necessary and appropriate" to extend TAA to ensure that those who lose from increased import competition have the opportunity to find new jobs and restore order to their lives. The marriage between TAA and opening U.S. markets to trade has allowed the United States to pursue a mostly free trade policy throughout the post-WWII era. Breaking that linkage now threatens the current FTAs and all future trade agreements.
Greg Mastel and Howard Rosen established the TAA Coalition -- a non-profit group devoted to improving the program's effectiveness. Mastel is also a Managing Director at Dutko Worldwide and Rosen is a Resident Visiting Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.