The Hill recently interviewed Margaret MacMillan about her new book, Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World (Random House, $27.95). The book lays out in rich detail the February 1972 summit between the two world leaders — one a soon-to-be-disgraced president, the other a dictator who had forced wrenching change on his country at horrific cost. The episode is still seen as a key turning point in the Cold War. The U.S. gained leverage with the U.S.S.R. while winding down the Vietnam War, and China took its first belated steps toward opening up to the world. As MacMillan sees it, there are still useful lessons for policymakers today.

Q: Although your book provides great detail on the week of the summit, your narrative runs on parallel tracks, delving into the histories of the main players as well as the entire diplomatic story of the American and Chinese going back a century. Why did you pick this particular week?
A: It was a breakthrough week. I find it very helpful to take a particular moment in time and then take apart the components as a way to understand the story. And it’s a great story. I was also interested because I have a background in Chinese history, so much of this was already familiar material.

Q: This story about how two long-time enemies came together in a strategic rapprochement seems particularly well timed, now that the Bush administration has signaled it may talk to Iran and Syria over Iraq and is working to secure a nuclear deal with the North Koreans. One could say Washington has seen something of a realist resurgence in the last year. Did you write the book with the present in mind?
A: I do agree there’s been a revival of sorts of the realpolitik that was embodied by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. And you are driven by the present when you write a book, even though you can’t anticipate what the news will bring a year or two down the road, once the book is done. In fact, I began this book right after the start of the Iraq war with all the debates of those days in my head. But I also did it because I find Nixon so fascinating. He was fundamentally an internationalist who believed in working with world organizations. He was also a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson and believed that the United States is a force of good in the world. At the same time, he wanted America to look out for its own interests. That’s what led to the summit.

Q: Another core theme in the book is that the summit came about only after both sides realized the limits of their own nation’s power. Back in 1969, Kissinger and other top officials were stating openly that American resources were finite and had to be redeployed prudently, while Mao allowed four of his top aides to conduct a rather extraordinary review of China’s position in the world — concluding that it needed to reach out to the United States in order to balance the Soviet Union. Do you think this was surprising, given everything we know about the personalities of Nixon and Mao today?
A: It is true that both men were deeply paranoid. But they were also very shrewd. By the end of the 1960s, China and the U.S. realized they could both gain by talking to each other and using that leverage against the Soviets. Mao understood just how friendless and vulnerable China was in the world, in part because of his own disastrous policies. And Nixon was well aware of the damage that the Vietnam War had done at home and abroad.

Q: Your book also provides a wealth of material on the two key lieutenants, Henry Kissinger, who loved the limelight, and Chou En-lai, a wily survivor who never stepped out of Mao’s shadow. As your account makes clear, they not only took care of the substance of the talks but also had a distinctive relationship with their bosses. How critical were they to the success of the summit?
A: Very critical. You need sharp people to carry out the big picture, and that’s exactly what they did. They were also two of the best diplomats of the 20th century, and as such, a perfect match for each other. It’s also important to understand how in sync they were with the grand strategic vision promoted by their leaders. Both were carrying out the will of their superiors and thinking through the practical implications of grand strategy.