The CSB, an independent federal agency, said the oil industry and regulators, before the spill, erred by judging offshore safety too narrowly based on injury and fatality data, which overshadowed focus on the potential for catastrophic accidents.
"We need to ensure that BP and the rest of the oil and gas industry are instituting a safety culture that will prevent such disasters from ever recurring. The CSB report suggests that, all too often, industry is looking at the wrong indicators for what risks a major accident. That is a disturbing conclusion that our committee needs to look at very closely," Markey said in a statement.
GOP spokespersons for the House Natural Resources Committee did not immediately respond to Markey's hearing request.
The CSB report joins other probes in finding a range of lapses by companies involved in drilling BP’s ill-fated Macondo well. The April 2010 well blowout and explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig killed 11 workers and ultimately dumped more than four million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.
“Before the Macondo blowout, the safety approaches and metrics used by the two companies and U.S. trade associations did not adequately focus on major accident hazards,” states the CSB in one of several conclusions unveiled Tuesday.
The report finds that industry and regulators failed to learn enough from the 2005 blast at BP’s Texas City refinery, which killed 15 people.
“Despite some significant progress with process safety indicator implementation in the downstream oil industry, in the offshore sector BP, Transocean, industry associations and the regulator had not effectively learned critical lessons of Texas City and other serious process incidents at the time of the Macondo blowout,” the CSB found.